Three Arguments Against Descriptivism

The arguments against descriptivism that Kripke presents in lecture 1 and 2 of Naming and Necessity have come to be known as the Modal, Semantic, and Epistemic arguments. The basic structure of the arguments is below. You should be able to provide either your own examples or examples from the book. 

Modal Argument
PN = proper name; DD = definite decription

1.    PNs are RDs
2.    DDs are not RDs
3.    If a PN is an RD and DDs are not RD, then PNs and DDs cannot mean the same thing
4.    Hence, PNs cannot mean the same thing as DDs

Ad 1:
PNs are RD: Aristotle and Jonah and Moses

Ad 2:
DDs are not RDs: Ben Franklin vs the inventor of bifocals

Ad 3:
Substitution of synonyms for synonyms in true non-propositional attitude contexts preserves truth
            Example: 
The inventor of bifocals is the inventor of bifocals
                        This is true, a priori, and necessary
            Benjamin Franklin is the inventor of bifocals
                        This is true, nota priori, and notnecessary

            So, while bare truth is preserved, the kind of truth is not preserved. 
            So, ‘Benjamin Franklin’ cannot mean the same thing as ‘the inventor of bifocals.’

Semantic Argument
Consider a name that you use for which you do not have a uniquely identifying description (no DDs). Does that mean that for you the name has no referent?  No, Kripke says.  

            Feynman Example: Feynman is a famous 20thcentury physicist

Consider a name that you use for which you have the wrong uniquely identifying description.  Does that mean that for you the name you use actually refers to some other person? No, Kripke says.

            Einstein example: Einstein is the guy who invented the atomic bomb
            Godel example:Godel is the guy who discovered the incompleteness of math

Version 1
1.    It is possible (happens all the time) for S to use a name to refer to the bearer of that name even though S does not have a uniquely identifying description associated with the name.
2.    If Descriptivism is true, 1 is false
3.    But 1 is clearly true
4.    Hence, descriptivism is not true

Version 2
1.    It is possible (happens all the time) for S to use a name to refer to the bearer of that name even though S has a uniquely identifying description in mind that is not true of the bearer of that name
2.    If descriptivism is true, 1 is false.
3.    But 1 is clearly true
4.    Hence, descriptivism is not true

Epistemic Argument
Consider a sentence of the form,

If the F exists, then the F is F.

Example: If the first person to walk on the moon exists, then first person to walk on the moon is the first person to walk on the moon

This appears to be knowable a priori. If so, then it seems that every sentence of the following form is true:

It is knowable a priori that, if the F exists, then the F is F.

Example: It is knowable a priori that, If the first person to walk on the moon exists, then first person to walk on the moon is the first person to walk on the moon

But now suppose that n is some name whose meaning, according to the description theory of names, is given by the description ‘the F.’ Then our principle of replacing synonyms without change of truth-value leads us to the claim that the following sentence is true:

It is knowable a priori that if the F exists, then n is F.

Example: It is knowable a priori that, If the first person to walk on the moon exists, then Neil Armstrong is the first person to walk on the moon

But for many name/description pairs which might be employed in a descriptivist theory, this will not hold. Compare:

It is knowable a priori that if the greatest philosopher of antiquity exists, then the greatest philosopher of antiquity is the greatest philosopher of antiquity.

It is knowable a priori that if the greatest philosopher of antiquity exists, then Aristotle is the greatest philosopher of antiquity.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Kaplan and Lewis

Let's see if we can make sense of the differences between Kaplan and Lewis.  Here is one way to see what Lewis is up to: Kaplan-to-Lewis Translation Method S is true relative to context C iff the character of S determines in C some content CON and CON is true relative to C It is important to see that what the above says is that Kaplan’s two levels of meaning are reducible to one level of meaning (remember my remark that Lewis is the arch-reductionist). The left side (the stuff before the ‘iff’) is equivalent to the right side (the stuff after the ‘iff’). So, if the above is correct, Kaplan’s two levels of meaning can be reduced to one level of meaning. It is not as though character and content are gone. They are just combined in one stage. The context C gets all of the stuff relevant to the character stage AND all of the stuff relevant to the content stage. So, C gets bloated in order to handle everything that is relevant for determining a truth-value of S. We just...
Read more

Grice's First Try

1 st Try : “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H First, let’s get clear on what this 1 st Try is saying: ‘x’ refers to an utterance of some sort, where even gestures and various other kinds of conventional signals count as utterances (e.g. three rings of the bell…). ‘MeantNN’ stands for ‘conventionally means’ or ‘has a meaning that is not determined by some natural law or whatever.’ ‘p’ refers to the proposition that the utterance expresses. For example, the proposition that my utterance of “Snow is white” and your utterance of “La nieve es blanca” both express the same exact proposition.  So, on the left side we have: an utterance of x conventionally means that p The right side should be fairly clear. It is saying that the utterance is intended to bring about a belief in someone. Putting this all together we get: an utterance of x conventionally means that p iff the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someo...
Read more

Donnellan on Russell

Attributive “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”  Referential “A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion ... uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing” “Smith’s murderer is insane.”  Russell : definite descriptions only apply to attributive uses (if it applies to anything) Donnellan : it is possible for someone to say something true even though nothing satisfies the description ‘the F’ in ‘the F is G.’ Semantics or Pragmatics              “Smith’s murderer is insane.”              Does the meaning of this sentence change on different occasions of use?          ...
Read more