HU-phillanguage

As I have mentioned a few times already, one of the important contributions of  Naming and Necessity is that it makes the distinctions between semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology more apparent and easier to draw. Kripke definitely has some metaphysical and epistemological claims that he wants to defend by using the approach he recommends, but I think it is a mistake to think that Kripke is pulling a metaphysical or epistemological rabbit out of a semantic hat (I’m borrowing this analogy from Nathan Salmon, who thinks that is what Kripke is trying to do). What he is doing is separating these areas and then putting them all to work together. It’s the Descriptivist who confuses the areas, and in some cases may be the Descriptivist is right to do so. But in some areas , the Descriptivist is not right to do so and Kripke’s approach helps us to see that more clearly.  Consider the term ‘God.’ If God is a name and thus a rigid designator, then the name ‘God’ refers to th...

Matthew 11:23 “And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day.” In this passage, Jesus is telling the persons of one city X that if the persons of another city Y had experienced what persons of X had experienced, the persons of city Y would have repented instead of being destroyed. In order for this to work it seems that we need to imagine the persons of Sodom experiences a bunch of things that they did not, in fact, experience. So, Jesus is saying that if history had gone differently (such that the persons of Sodom had seen what the persons of Capernaum are seeing), then the persons of Sodom would have reacted differently than the persons of Capernaum are in fact reacting.  Now, there is a way to construe what Jesus is saying that is compatible with either Kripke’s account or with the account he is criticizing.  On Kripke’s ac...

Suppose the F/R or some variant like the Cluster Theory is correct; names mean their associated descriptions. ‘9’ seems to be a name. So the meaning of ‘9’ or ‘nine’ just is its associated description(s). Here’s a description: the necessarily odd number after 8. Here’s another: the number of planets in our solar system. Those DDs on F/R and Cluster are synonymous with the name ‘9’ or ‘nine.’ Since it is perfectly legitimate to substitute synonyms for synonyms we can say that “the necessarily odd number after 8 is the number of planets in our solar system. So, the number of planets in our solar system is the necessarily odd number after 8. From which we infer, that the number of the planets in our solar system is necessarily odd. Yikes, we have just concluded a very deep and seemingly obviously false modal fact about the structure of the universe from the description theory of names. What should we do? We can either, it seems, deny the modal fact somehow or deny the description theory ...

Explain why identity statements are puzzling and the various ways we have investigated for solving the puzzle(s). (Frege, Russell, Kripke) Explain Frege’s notions of sense and reference. Make sure you include his theory about direct and indirect discourse and how names or expressions have an ordinary reference in direct discourse and refer to their ordinary sense in indirect discourse Explain the differences between Frege and Russell on referring or denoting expressions Explain how Russell solves the three puzzles near the end of his paper Explain Donnellan's critique of Russell Explain Russell’s theory of definite descriptions (or the description theory of names) and Kripke’s reasons (you don’t have to present all of them) for rejecting the theory as a theory of names Explain the distinction between a theory of meaning and a theory of referring (Kripke) Explain Kripke’s notion of a rigid designator and how this allows for a metaphysics of modality (e.g. how it allows us t...

Think of possible worlds  as various ways the world could have been.  You could be going to a different college.  There is a description of a world that has you going to a different college.  Someone else could be the president.  That is there is a coherent description of a world in which someone else is the president.  All the ways the world could have been are different possible worlds (and of course our world—the actual world—is a way the world could have been).  You can think of a possible world as a  maximally consistent description of the way things could have been.  Our world is like that. Possible worlds can be thought of as simply helpful tools for regimenting language and logic.  They help us get clear on the meaning and logical patterns associated with particular terms/concepts such as—would, could, should, must, might, can, cannot, necessarily, possibly, impossibly, etc. Pos...

Attributive “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”  Referential “A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion ... uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing” “Smith’s murderer is insane.”  Russell : definite descriptions only apply to attributive uses (if it applies to anything) Donnellan : it is possible for someone to say something true even though nothing satisfies the description ‘the F’ in ‘the F is G.’ Semantics or Pragmatics              “Smith’s murderer is insane.”              Does the meaning of this sentence change on different occasions of use?          ...

We have just recently learned that scope ambiguities can alter our assessment of various claims. Here are some examples of scope ambiguities: I believe that aliens do not exist.              This is ambiguous between (a)    It is not the case that I believe that aliens exist (b)    I believe that it is not the case that aliens exist Now, (a) is compatible with                                       (a*) It is not the case that I believe that aliens do not exist The reason that (a) and (a*) are compatible (both can be true of me) is that I might not have any beliefs about the existence of aliens. I neither believe nor disbelieve in their existence. But (b) is not compatible with (a*). If I believe (b), I...

As we have seen Russell wants to show that denoting phrases can be reduced to non-denoting phrases. Doing so allows us, in a sense, to stop worrying about whether such phrases really refer to objects (of course, we will still be interested in such things, but for different reasons). Russell's analysis allows us to say the exact same thing about all propositions that have denoting phrases as parts. The denoting phrase is really functioning like a predicate--it refers to some feature that is either had by something or not. Example : the evening star is a planet           Is analyzed as: there is something that evening stars; at most one x evening stars; x is a planet. If something satisfies those conditions, then our original statement is true; if not, then not. As we have also seen (well, I just told you), Russell thinks that pretty every ordinary proper name is really a disguised description. So, 'Aristotle' is really short for 'the student of Plato' or ...

Donnellan makes a number of distinctions in his paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions.” All are important, interesting, and related. But the one that jumped out at me was near the end of the paper where Donnellan is discussing Linky’s example of the person who says of a spinster “Her husband is kind to her.” Donnellan notes if the speaker is using the description referentially, then we can agree with the speaker, even if we know that the woman has no husband. Indeed, we can tell others that the speaker said OF Jones that he is kind to the spinster, or OF the president of the university that he is kind to the spinster. It turns out that the speaker may very well have said something true, something that we can tell others using different descriptions. These points have all sorts of fascinating implications for reading and listening with love. Think about how much of our current pollical situation is filled with vitriol and how much of it is based on tons of misrepresentation an...

Here is a very simple, but I hope helpful, way of reconstructing Frege’s overall argument in On Sense and Reference: 1. It seems that identity statements (a = a; a = b) are either relations between the signs or the referent (the thing the sign refers to).  2. But it’s not plausible to think that identity statements are relations between the signs. Much of the time, our interest in identity statements is not plausibly thought of as being an interest in the signs themselves. The signs are vehicles to get to objects (either abstract or concrete) in the world. When we realize that the morning star is the evening star we have realized something about the world.  Furthermore, signs are different from language to language, speaker to speaker, time to time, place to place, etc.  3. Nor is it plausible to think that identity statements are relations between the referent.  If they are relations between the referent, then they cease to be informative and ...

Here is our course blog. I will email you when a new post is up. Feel free to comment on anything. I will consider it as class participation. Do not worry about making a smart or interesting comment. This stuff is some of the toughest material in all of philosophy (and academia in general). Here is our course syllabus (I will correct it as we go :-)) Instructor Information :           Dr. David Alexander Phone:  359-4305  Email:  dalexander@huntington.edu Office Location: LB 223 Office Hours: Email me for a specific time, or I will be on campus all day MWF (roughly 9-5).  Please feel free to stop by my office anytime I am in it.   Course Description:                  There are a number of ways to approach language and many of these ways overlap.  A scientific study of language may include ...