HU-phillanguage

2 nd Try :    “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H and S intends H to recognize the intention of S. Once again, we need to make sure that we understand what the above is saying. Given the past post, I can be brief about this.  Left-side: an utterance x conventionally means that p Right-side: the utterance x is intended by S to bring about a belief in someone H and S intends for H to recognize the intention of S (i.e. to recognize that S intends for H to believe that p) And once again the ‘iff’ part can be broken down into its parts: 3.      If an utterance x conventionally means that p, then the utterance x is intended by S to bring about a belief in someone H and S intends for H to recognize the intention of S (i.e. to recognize that S intends for H to believe that p)              AND 4.      If the utterance x is intended b...

1 st Try : “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H First, let’s get clear on what this 1 st Try is saying: ‘x’ refers to an utterance of some sort, where even gestures and various other kinds of conventional signals count as utterances (e.g. three rings of the bell…). ‘MeantNN’ stands for ‘conventionally means’ or ‘has a meaning that is not determined by some natural law or whatever.’ ‘p’ refers to the proposition that the utterance expresses. For example, the proposition that my utterance of “Snow is white” and your utterance of “La nieve es blanca” both express the same exact proposition.  So, on the left side we have: an utterance of x conventionally means that p The right side should be fairly clear. It is saying that the utterance is intended to bring about a belief in someone. Putting this all together we get: an utterance of x conventionally means that p iff the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someo...

  RD stands for rigid designator We now know, assuming Kripke is correct, that if RD1 = RD2 is true, then it is necessarily true. That is, we know true identity statements that have rigid designators on both sides of the identity are true no matter what. They are true in all possible worlds. They are true in all possible histories of our world. No matter how our world could be, such statements cannot be false.  Example 1 : Water = H2O. Both sides are RDs. Hence, if that statement is true it is true in all possible worlds. There is no way our world could be such that Water is not H20. Water just is H2O. Since, the term ‘water’ (as we use it here and now) picks out the same stuff in every possible circumstance, and since the term ‘H20’ (as we use it here and now) picks out the same stuff in all possible circumstances, if Water = H2O, then that statement is true in all possible circumstances. We might associate all sorts of things with water—it falls from the sky, fills ...

The arguments against descriptivism that Kripke presents in lecture 1 and 2 of  Naming and Necessity  have come to be known as the Modal, Semantic, and Epistemic arguments. The basic structure of the arguments is below. You should be able to provide either your own examples or examples from the book.  Modal Argument PN = proper name; DD = definite decription 1.    PNs are RDs 2.    DDs are not RDs 3.    If a PN is an RD and DDs are not RD, then PNs and DDs cannot mean the same thing 4.    Hence, PNs cannot mean the same thing as DDs Ad 1: PNs are RD: Aristotle and Jonah and Moses Ad 2: DDs are not RDs: Ben Franklin vs the inventor of bifocals Ad 3: Substitution of synonyms for synonyms in true non-propositional attitude contexts preserves truth              Example :  The inventor of bifocal...