Donnellan on Russell

Attributive
“A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so” 

Referential
“A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion ... uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing”
“Smith’s murderer is insane.” 

Russell: definite descriptions only apply to attributive uses (if it applies to anything)

Donnellan: it is possible for someone to say something true even though nothing satisfies the description ‘the F’ in ‘the F is G.’

Semantics or Pragmatics
            “Smith’s murderer is insane.” 
            Does the meaning of this sentence change on different occasions of use? 
            
OR

Does the meaning remain the same and the use requires us to evaluate the sentence differently?

Russellian Scope to the Rescue
Perhaps we can save Russell’s semantic analysis by appealing to Russell’s scope distinctions

I think that Smith’s murderer is insane

Description takes narrow scope:I think that [whoever murdered Smith is insane]

Description takes wide scope: There is one and only one person who murdered Smith, and I think of that person that he is insane 

Description+ takes wide scope: there is one and only one person who I think murdered Smith, and I think of that person that he is insane

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