Grice's First Try

1stTry: “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H
First, let’s get clear on what this 1stTry is saying: ‘x’ refers to an utterance of some sort, where even gestures and various other kinds of conventional signals count as utterances (e.g. three rings of the bell…). ‘MeantNN’ stands for ‘conventionally means’ or ‘has a meaning that is not determined by some natural law or whatever.’ ‘p’ refers to the proposition that the utterance expresses. For example, the proposition that my utterance of “Snow is white” and your utterance of “La nieve es blanca” both express the same exact proposition. 
So, on the left side we have: an utterance of x conventionally means that p
The right side should be fairly clear. It is saying that the utterance is intended to bring about a belief in someone. Putting this all together we get:
an utterance of x conventionally means that p iff the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someone
But now we need to get clear on the significance of the ‘iff’ part. X iff Y means that if x, then y, and if y, then x. Put differently, it means that x is necessary and sufficient for y and y is necessary and sufficient for x. That means, that without x there is no y and without y and there is no x and with x there is y and with y there is x. 
Example: Socrates is human iff Socrates is made in God’s image. So, if Soc is human, then Soc is made in God’s image, and if Soc is made in God’s image, then Soc is human. Put differently, Soc’s being human is necessary and sufficient for Soc’s being made in God’s image. That means that without Soc being human, Soc is not made in God’s image and without Soc’s being made in God’s image, Soc is not human
So, the 1stTry is telling is that if the left side, then the right side, and if the right side then the left. 
1.    If an utterance of x conventionally means that p, then the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someone
            AND
2.    If the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someone, then an utterance of x conventionally means that p
In other words, both 1 and 2 have to be true in order for the 1stTry to be true. But, argues Grice both are not true. In particular, 2 is false. But why?
Problem for 2:In the handkerchief example, Grice is trying to show that merely intending that an utterance (in this case a left behind DNA-laden handkerchief) bring about a belief in someone is simply not enough for the utterance to conventionally mean that ‘Laura did it.’ The reason is that I can drop the handkerchief at the scene of the crime with the intention that the police see it and conclude that Laura did it even though the police have no clue that that’s why I dropped the handkerchief. They do not even need to know that I dropped it or that anyone did. For all they know it blew over there by the wind. So, suppose I drop the handkerchief, the police pick it up the next day without a clue about how it got there, and conclude that Laura did it. Is that enough for dropping the handkerchief to conventionally mean that ‘Laura did it’? Grice says, ‘no!’ 

I think that the most obvious way to see why Grice thinks this is to go back to the measles example. ‘Those spots mean measles’ is an instance of natural meaning (or as Grice later calls it, indicator meaning). If those spots are really measles spots, then their presence guarantees the presence of measles. In a similar way, the presence of the handkerchief plus all of the background conditions (the crime scene, the blood, etc) together imply that Laura did it. (I grant that the implication is not as tight but ignore that for the moment). The fact that I left the handkerchief and intended for the police to reach the conclusion they do reach is irrelevant for them to reach that conclusion. So, my leaving the handkerchief and intending the police to believe that Laura did it is not enough to make my leaving the handkerchief conventionally mean that ‘Laura did it.’

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