Grice's Second Try


2ndTry:  “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H and S intends H to recognize the intention of S.
Once again, we need to make sure that we understand what the above is saying. Given the past post, I can be brief about this. 
Left-side: an utterance x conventionally means that p
Right-side: the utterance x is intended by S to bring about a belief in someone H and S intends for H to recognize the intention of S (i.e. to recognize that S intends for H to believe that p)
And once again the ‘iff’ part can be broken down into its parts:
3.    If an utterance x conventionally means that p, then the utterance x is intended by S to bring about a belief in someone H and S intends for H to recognize the intention of S (i.e. to recognize that S intends for H to believe that p)
            AND
4.    If the utterance x is intended by S to bring about a belief in someone H and S intends for H to recognize the intention of S (i.e. to recognize that S intends for H to believe that p), then an utterance x conventionally means that p
And once again the problem is with the second conditional statement, what I numbered 4 above. In other words, Grice thinks that S can intend for H to believe that p and S can intend for H to recognize the intention of S for H to believe that p without it being the case that S’s utterance of x conventionally means that p. So, 4 is false. 
The basic worry is this: that the intention of S and H’s recognition of that intention can come apart.  H may believe what S intends without believing it because S intends H to believe it. That is, H believes that p but not on the basis of the intention of S that H believe that p.  Instead, H believes that p for some other reason not connected with S’s intention.
Example: In the photograph case, Steve shows Paul a photo of Paul’s wife Pam kissing Jon. Paul, let’s say, immediately forms the belief that his wife is cheating on him with Jon. So, we have:
a.    The showing of the photo (this is the x, the utterance)
b.    The showing of the photo is intended by Steve to bring about the belief in Paul that Pam is cheating on him with Jon
c.    Steve intends for Paul to recognize that Steve intends for Paul to believe that Pam is cheating on him with Jon. 
The above, a-c, are the first part of 4 (all the stuff before ‘then’)
But, Paul immediately forms the belief that Pam is cheating on him with Jon. Paul does not believe this becauseof Steve’s intention. He believes it because of the contents of the photo. So, Paul believes what Steve is intending him to believe, but Paul does not do so because of his recognition of that intention. He does because of the contents of the photo all by itself. So, Grice concludes, this is not a case of conventionally meaning something. So, the second try fails to capture conventional meaning. 

And once again I think that the most obvious way to see why Grice thinks this is to go back to the measles example. ‘Those spots mean measles’ is an instance of natural meaning (or as Grice later calls it, indicator meaning). If those spots are really measles spots, then their presence guarantees the presence of measles. In a similar way, the contents of the photo alone plus all of the background conditions (it is a genuine photo, it is not a genuine photo of an scene in a play, etc) together imply that Pam is cheating. The fact that Steve gave Paul the photo and intended for the Paul to reach the conclusion he does reach and intends Paul to recognize that intention is irrelevant for Paul to reach that conclusion. So, Steve’s intending Paul to form the belief that his wife is cheating and Steve’s intention for Paul to recognize that that is Steve’s intention is not enough to make Steve’s giving the Photo to Paul to conventionallymean that ‘Your wife is cheating.’

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