Scope Ambiguities and Philosophy of Religion

We have just recently learned that scope ambiguities can alter our assessment of various claims. Here are some examples of scope ambiguities:

I believe that aliens do not exist.

            This is ambiguous between
(a)  It is not the case that I believe that aliens exist
(b)  I believe that it is not the case that aliens exist

Now, (a) is compatible with 
                                    (a*) It is not the case that I believe that aliens do not exist

The reason that (a) and (a*) are compatible (both can be true of me) is that I might not have any beliefs about the existence of aliens. I neither believe nor disbelieve in their existence. But (b) is not compatible with (a*). If I believe (b), I believe that there are no aliens in the universe. But if I believe (a*) and (a) I do not believe that there are no aliens in the universe. In other words, by holding to (a) and (a*) I am saying that I have suspended belief altogether regarding the existence of aliens.

I love the most beautiful photographer. 

            This is ambiguous between:
(c)  There is a person x who is the most beautiful photographer, and I love x
(d)  I love whoever happens to be the most beautiful photographer

According to (c), there is a particular person that love. But according to (d) I love whoever it is that satisfies the condition of being the most beautiful photographer. 

Scope ambiguities are important to recognize in all sorts of areas (logic, linguistics, history, politics, policy, etc), but I want to focus on epistemology and then apply what we learn to philosophy of religion. 

Epistemic Scope Ambiguities
Suppose I say to you after looking into the kitchen that there do not appear to be any ants in the kitchen. This is, once again, ambiguous between two readings. 

(e)  It is not the case that it appears to me that there are ants in the kitchen
(f)   It appears to me that there are no ants in the kitchen

(e) like (c) above is compatible with 
                        (e*) It is not the case that it appears to be that there are no ants in the kitchen

In other words, (e) and (e*) can both be true, which implies that it neither appears to me that there are ants in the kitchen nor does it appear to me that there are no ants in the kitchen. So, (e) (and (e*) are weaker than (f) in the following way: If (f) is true, then I am warranted in believing that there are no ants in the kitchen. But if (e) is all I meant then I am not warranted in believing that there are no ants in the kitchen. Here’s one reason why:

Many people think that something like the following principle is true:

            Appearance: If it appears to S that p, then S is warranted in believing that p

Appearance is a pretty decent principle to live by, at least when it comes to some appearance claims, and at least when we disambiguate appearance claims. Now, notice that (e) does not permit me to apply Appearance. According to (e) I am simply not having a particular appearance and so I am not warranted in believing anything regarding ants in the kitchen. (Note that (e) could be truthfully said by someone who has not even looking into the kitchen.) But (f) does allow me to apply Appearance. If (f) is true, then I am warranted in believing that there are no ants in the kitchen. 

Suppose someone says this: It appears that God does not have any reason for allowing this suffering.  

            This is ambiguous between the following:
(g)   It does not appear that God has a reason for allowing this suffering
(h)  It appears that God does not have a reason for allowing this suffering.
By applying our understanding of scope ambiguity and a fairly plausible epistemic principle like Appearance, we can now see that only (h) will justify or warrant someone in believing that God does not have a reason for allowing this suffering. If all we are justified in saying is (g), then nothing of serious consequence will follow. Indeed, I think it is perfectly fine for Christians to think (g) at various stages of their experience. But, I am quite skeptical that anyone is justified in thinking (h). 
If (h) were justified for someone then they could generate a fairly powerful argument against the existence of God.
  1. If it appears to S that p, then S is warranted in believing that p
  2. It appears that God does not have a reason for allowing this suffering ((h) above)
  3. Hence, we are warranted in believing that God does not have a reason for allowing this suffering
  4. An instance of suffering for which there is no reason for it is a pointless evil.
  5. Hence, we are warranted in believing that there are pointless evils
  6. If God exists, there are no pointless evils
  7. Hence, we are warranted in believing that God does not exist
But now consider whether we are warranted in believing (h).  It seems that the most we are warranted in believing is (g).  But from (g) we cannot validly infer (h). Hence, from (g) we cannot validly infer that we (or someone using this line of reasoning) are warranted in believing that God does not exist. 


By seeing the difference between (g) and (h), we can see that only one of them can be used as a reason to doubt God’s existence. Russell to the rescue of theism!

Comments

  1. UnknownSeptember 14, 2018 at 8:49 AM

    "Russell to the rescue of theism!" is a phrase I'm sure he never thought anyone would say.

    I really, really like this example.

    ReplyDelete
  2. David AlexanderSeptember 15, 2018 at 10:18 AM

    Hah! Yes, I hope to God he is enjoying it now.

    ReplyDelete

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