Descriptivism and Modality

Suppose the F/R or some variant like the Cluster Theory is correct; names mean their associated descriptions. ‘9’ seems to be a name. So the meaning of ‘9’ or ‘nine’ just is its associated description(s). Here’s a description: the necessarily odd number after 8. Here’s another: the number of planets in our solar system. Those DDs on F/R and Cluster are synonymous with the name ‘9’ or ‘nine.’ Since it is perfectly legitimate to substitute synonyms for synonyms we can say that “the necessarily odd number after 8 is the number of planets in our solar system. So, the number of planets in our solar system is the necessarily odd number after 8. From which we infer, that the number of the planets in our solar system is necessarily odd. Yikes, we have just concluded a very deep and seemingly obviously false modal fact about the structure of the universe from the description theory of names. What should we do? We can either, it seems, deny the modal fact somehow or deny the description theory of names. 

Denying the Modality:to do this we simply say that objects have their properties either necessarily or contingently (essentially or accidentally) in virtue of how WE describe them or pick them out. So, modal facts are facts about language, not facts about the world. Use the language differently and you get a completely different world. The number 9 is necessarily odd when describing the world one way and it is not necessarily odd when describing the world another way. So, there really is no such thing as modal facts about the world. The way the world is turns out to be relativized to our decisions about language use. 

Deny Descriptivism:this is Kripke’s move. One way to interpret the move is to see it as an attempt to vindicate a full-blown essentialism or Aristotelianism about the world. In other words, Kripke is arguing against descriptivism in order to argue for essentialism or modal facts being mind-independent features of the world. But another way, I think the correct way, to interpret the move is to see it as an attempt to separate semantics from metaphysics. Kripke is simply showing us that descriptivism confuses these areas (along with epistemology) in ways that are (a) unnecessary—we do not have to buy it—and (b) unintuitive—it does not comport with our semantic intuitions. In other words, Kripke is showing us that if he is right, you can argue for essentialism or against it. Either position is compatible with his account. But either position is not really compatible with descriptivism and that’s a strike against descriptivism as well. So, we get a (c): descriptivism is too metaphysically limiting. 

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Kaplan and Lewis

Let's see if we can make sense of the differences between Kaplan and Lewis.  Here is one way to see what Lewis is up to: Kaplan-to-Lewis Translation Method S is true relative to context C iff the character of S determines in C some content CON and CON is true relative to C It is important to see that what the above says is that Kaplan’s two levels of meaning are reducible to one level of meaning (remember my remark that Lewis is the arch-reductionist). The left side (the stuff before the ‘iff’) is equivalent to the right side (the stuff after the ‘iff’). So, if the above is correct, Kaplan’s two levels of meaning can be reduced to one level of meaning. It is not as though character and content are gone. They are just combined in one stage. The context C gets all of the stuff relevant to the character stage AND all of the stuff relevant to the content stage. So, C gets bloated in order to handle everything that is relevant for determining a truth-value of S. We just...
Read more

Grice's First Try

1 st Try : “x meantNN that p” iff x was intended by S to induce a belief in H First, let’s get clear on what this 1 st Try is saying: ‘x’ refers to an utterance of some sort, where even gestures and various other kinds of conventional signals count as utterances (e.g. three rings of the bell…). ‘MeantNN’ stands for ‘conventionally means’ or ‘has a meaning that is not determined by some natural law or whatever.’ ‘p’ refers to the proposition that the utterance expresses. For example, the proposition that my utterance of “Snow is white” and your utterance of “La nieve es blanca” both express the same exact proposition.  So, on the left side we have: an utterance of x conventionally means that p The right side should be fairly clear. It is saying that the utterance is intended to bring about a belief in someone. Putting this all together we get: an utterance of x conventionally means that p iff the utterance of x is intended by S (the utterer) to bring about a belief in someo...
Read more

Donnellan on Russell

Attributive “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so”  Referential “A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion ... uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing” “Smith’s murderer is insane.”  Russell : definite descriptions only apply to attributive uses (if it applies to anything) Donnellan : it is possible for someone to say something true even though nothing satisfies the description ‘the F’ in ‘the F is G.’ Semantics or Pragmatics              “Smith’s murderer is insane.”              Does the meaning of this sentence change on different occasions of use?          ...
Read more